Research
Dissertation work
An overarching theme of my dissertation research is that entrepreneurs can usefully be understood as quasi-scientists who develop theories about the world and test them through experimentation. I’m particularly interested in how an entrepreneur’s relationship with their audience affects the way they develop and test their theories. For this reason, I do much of my research in the context of cultural markets, like video game livestreaming platforms, because they allow me to observe how entrepreneurs interact with their audiences.
My job market paper examines how theories of value shape the category schemes that people use to evaluate entrepreneurs. In another paper, I examine how audience concerns about commitment shape the dynamics of entrepreneurial experimentation.
Job market paper: Confusing or coherent? How category spanning by livestreamers reflects competing theories of value
Abstract: Why are some combinations of categories more viable than others? Prior work has examined conditions under which people are generally more or less tolerant of offerings that span multiple categories, but this leaves open the question of why some combinations of categories remain more viable than others. I develop and test a theory in which people evaluate category-spanning offerings using a standard of theoretical coherence—whether a particular combination coheres with their theory of value. To measure coherence from the perspective of different theories of value, I develop a measure using word embedding models that can readily be applied to other settings. Key implications of the theory are validated using data on the video game repertoires of livestreamers on the platform Twitch.tv. By providing an alternative explanation of how categories constrain strategic choice and valuation, the standard of theoretical coherence allows us to move beyond debates about typicality and specialist vs. generalist premiums to focus on which particular combinations of categories are viable.
The product/market tradeoff: How demand for commitment shapes the dynamics of entrepreneurial experimentation
Abstract: Entrepreneurial experiments are thought to improve outcomes because they avoid commitment and create real options, allowing the entrepreneur to identify new, attractive markets as they refine their idea. This paper documents a case where audiences demand prior commitment before they will tolerate experimentation. Building on this case, I develop theory that identifies a tradeoff faced by entrepreneurs who wish to use experiments to test the viability of their ideas. The tradeoff relates to the need to commit to an audience before the audience will tolerate experimentation. On one hand, entrepreneurs who enact a strong commitment to their audience find that their audience is more tolerant of experimentation, which in turn allows them to trial cruder prototypes and a run more experiments than a weakly committed entrepreneur. On the other hand, this commitment entails an obligation to heed feedback, resulting in a trajectory that reinforces appeal to the current audience at the expense of growth in new markets. I validate two key implications of this theory using data from a large livestreaming platform. I find that streamers who enact a strong commitment strategy experience less viewer drop-off when experimenting with new additions to their repertoire but that each addition leads to less growth in viewership than streamers who enact a weak commitment strategy. This implies that the entrepreneurial experimentation must, at least in some contexts, be understood as a relational process and that the commitment required for audiences to tolerate experimentation results in a tradeoff between growth on the intensive vs. extensive margin.
‘I love you, now do your fair share!’ Why the norm of reciprocity is more salient when ties are strong (with Ezra Zuckerman Sivan)
Abstract: Since Gouldner (1960), social scientists have seen the generalized norm of reciprocity (NOR) as an internalized norm that provides a key “starting mechanism” for exchange among strangers. However, we observe that the NOR is more frequently invoked among strong ties—i.e., where it is presumably extraneous and even off-putting. To explain this difference and provide a stronger foundation for understanding how the NOR facilitates social exchange, we rework Leifer’s (1988) theory of “local action” so that it encompasses a broader array of strategic motives. Whereas Leifer explained why strangers will avoid invoking the NOR in a bid to limit risky claims to status, our theory entails that such avoidance can be expected whenever instrumental goals are salient and mutual commitment is low. And since the costs of imbalance are high precisely when mutual commitment is high (as the parties may be “stuck” with the imbalance “forever”), parties to strong ties should be more likely to invoke the NOR. Two online vignette experiments provide preliminary support for the theory.